debt to Kant's transcendental philosophy. My interest in Hegel's exposition of "Ground" in the Doctrine of Essence of the Science of Logic had initially been elicited by the fact that Hegel appeared to offer a concept of totality, and of the complex correlations between an empirical multiplicity of elements and the unifying structures organizing them, far more complex and interesting than the teleological model Althusser attributed to Hegel. But now in exploring Hegel's explanation of "ground" it became obvious to me that Hegel's version of the relation between empirical multiplicity and its unifying principle was inspired by Kant's analysis of the relation between the inexhaustible multiplicity of possible empirical entities and their law-like unity, and by Kant's account of the dependence of the law-like unity of nature on what he called the "transcendental unity of self-consciousness," namely the principle of mental activity that ensures that all our representations will belong to a single unified consciousness. Similarly, in studying Hegel's section on "contradiction" I became convinced that Hegel's treatment of "identity," "difference," "opposition," and "contradiction" could be understood only in light of Kant's treatment of the very same concepts in the chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason entitled "The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection." Indeed, Kant's description of those concepts as "concepts of reflection" is echoed in Hegel's description of them as "essentialities or determinations of reflection." Thus a project that started as an exploration of Marx's debt (or lack thereof) to Hegel, became an exploration of Hegel's response to Kant. There is a striking similarity between the interpretation I proposed of the relation between Hegel's "speculative" logic and Kant's "transcendental" logic, and the view defended by Robert Pippin in his groundbreaking Hegel's Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, 1989). Pippin's book is broader in scope, offering an interpretation of Hegel's system as the culmination of Kant's transcendental enterprise freed from the various guises of Kant's dualism: dualism of reason and sensibility, of thing in itself and appearance, of natural necessity and freedom. My own book focused on only a few chapters of the Doctrine of Essence (Book 2 of the first part of the Science of Logic: "The Objective Logic"). The reason for this choice, after I realized my interest was shifting from Hegel as an ancestor of Marx to Hegel as a descendant of Kant, was that Hegel himself described more specifically the second book of the Science of Logic (to which "ground" and "contradiction" belong) as the true successor to Kant's Transcendental Logic. It remained unclear to me, in light of my analyses of the Doctrine of Essence, how much of my interpretation of Hegel's Logic in relation to Kant's transcendental philosophy still held up when one proceeds from the Objective Logic to the Subjective Logic or Doctrine of the Concept, where Hegel takes himself to move decisively beyond Kant toward his own "speculative logic." More specifically, I was unsure how much of my defense of Hegel as the successor of Kant's critique of dogmatic metaphysics still stands once one moves to Hegel's Subjective Logic. And I was unsure how well Hegel's view of the relation between "ground" and "conditions," unity of thought and plurality of empirical elements, holds up in the face of Hegel's exposition of objectivity as the self-development of the concept.
I therefore embarked on a systematic study of the Subjective Logic. The first hurdle along the way was the extensive praise and criticism of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories with which Hegel opens this second part of his Science of Logic. In order to form for myself a clearer view of Hegel's position and its relation to Kant's, I returned to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and fell head first into the ocean of Kant's xvi preface philosophy. Instead of a book on Hegel's Subjective Logic, I produced a book on Kant's first Critique (Kant et le Pouvoir de Juger, whose original French version appeared in 1993; its expanded English version, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, was published in 1998 by Princeton University Press). In the meantime, I did come up with at least some answers to the questions just mentioned, concerning the overall import of Hegel's Logic. These answers are presented in the two chapters that form Part II of the book.
Chapter 5 I analyze the change in the meaning of these notions from Kant's transcendental to Hegel's speculative logic, finding help in an earlier text of Hegel, the 1801 Faith and Knowledge, where Hegel offers a systematic evaluation of Kant's standpoint in all three Critiques and defines his own philosophical project in contrast to Kant's. While Hegel's standpoint undergoes significant changes from Faith and Knowledge to the Science of Logic (I lay out some of these changes at the end of the chapter), nevertheless the earlier text is invaluable in helping us understand Hegel's radical revision of Kant's notion of "reason" and his related revisions, at least in the context of "speculative" logic, of Kant's notions of "concept" and "judgment."
The original version of Chapter 6 ("Hegel on Kant on judgment") was written and published in French in 1992. Its main focus is Hegel's notion of "Judgment" (as expounded in the Subjective Logic) in contrast to Kant's. Despite his harsh criticism of Kant's table of logical functions of judgment and what he deems its "empirical" character, Hegel seems faithfully to follow the pattern established by Kant in his table, consisting of four main titles of judgment (quantity, quality, relation, modality), and three divisions under each title (affirmative, negative, infinite; universal, particular, singular; categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive; problematic, assertoric, apodictic) . I show how and why in Hegel's reading, the four titles and their three respective divisions distinguish judgments considered not just in their form but also in their content, and what this tells us about the shift from Kant's "general formal" to Hegel's "speculative" logic. preface xvii Chapters 5 and 6 both end on a fairly negative note. In Chapter 5, I express doubts about Hegel's charge against Kant, according to which Kant was wrong to give up on his own most important discovery when he treated as a merely negative notion the idea of an intuitive understanding, which Kant introduced both in the first and in the third Critique to illuminate a contrario the nature and limitations of our own finite, discursive understanding. In Chapter 6, I express doubts about Hegel's reinterpretation of Kant's four titles and twelve divisions of elementary logical functions of judgment in the context of his own "absolute judgment," and about Hegel's definition of "the rational" as a kind of realized syllogism: an individual entity (e.g. a house, or a human community) instantiating a universal concept (e.g. "family home," "State") by virtue of its particular constitution (e.g. the architectural structure of the house, the Constitution that organizes the community). How do my doubts about those points relate to the more positive assessment I gave of Hegel's enterprise in the Doctrine of Essence?
In the Introduction to the Science of Logic, Hegel proclaims his debt to Kant's idea that metaphysics should now be logic. What Hegel means by this, I proposed in my study of Hegel's Doctrine of Essence, is that rather than the empty endeavor to come up with a science of being qua being or a science of the universal determinations of things as they are in themselves, metaphysics after Kant is a science of being as being thought. In other words, metaphysics is an investigation of the universal determinations of thought at work in any attempt to think what is. Hegel goes even further than Kant, I maintained, in claiming that the kinds of entities under consideration depend on the kind of thought at work in individuating them, or on what Hegel calls the "attitude of thought toward objectivity." This being so, "truth" in metaphysical thinking does not consist in the agreement of thought to an object supposed to be independent of it, but rather in the grasp of the fundamental set of thought-determinations by which an object is individuated, as well as the grasp of the place of these thought-determinations in what Hegel calls the movement of thinking in general, i.e. the space of concepts under which any object at all is determined. Grasping the universal features of that movement of thinking is what is supposed to be achieved when we reach the "Absolute Idea," the final chapter in Hegel's Science of Logic. According to the interpretation of Hegel's view I offered in Hegel et la Critique de la Métaphysique, this was how Hegel claimed to refute both the empty claims of pre-Kantian dogmatic metaphysics and Kant's subjectivism and psychological idealism: grasping the movement xviii preface of thought (the set of conceptual determinations) by which a thing is individuated as the kind of thing it is was grasping die Sache selbst, the very matter at hand. It was grasping what it is that makes the thing as it appears the kind of appearance it is, by grasping its proper place in the thought process that provides the framework for any determination of thing.
However, this way of characterizing Hegel's project in the Science of Logic appeared radically insufficient once I started exploring Hegel's endorsement of Kant's "intuitive understanding" as "the true idea of reason" and Hegel's related metaphysical reconstructions of Kant's notions of "concept" and "judgment" in the Subjective Logic. In its early version (as I analyze it in Hegel's 1801 Faith and Knowledge) and even more in its mature version (in the Introduction to the Subjective Logic in the Science of Logic) Hegel's endorsement of Kant's "intuitive understanding" is the key to Hegel's claim that the Science of Logic expounds "the presentation of God, as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit" or again his claim that the concept of God, rather than "I think," is the proper starting point of all philosophy. This radical shift of perspective is what I emphasize in taking up as the title of Part II of this book an expression present in the title of my 1995 essay (now Chapter 5): "Point of view of man or knowledge of God." The alternative under examination is that between Kant's avowed limitation of his critical philosophy to the human, "finite" standpoint (both theoretical and practical) and Hegel's claim to bring about, in expounding the "pure thought-determination" of the Science of Logic, precisely the kind of absolute standpoint Kant described as that of an "intuitive understanding" and presented, in § §76-77 of the Critique of Judgment, as a mere problematic concept meant to clarify by contrast the nature and limitations of human understanding.
Of course, it is by no means obvious that taking into account Hegel's emphasis on the standpoint of an intuitive understanding or "God's knowledge" as the backbone to the whole enterprise of the Science of Logic, is incompatible with the analysis of the Doctrine of Essence outlined above. On the contrary, one might read it along the very same lines of interpretation, and say that in emphasizing -against Kantthe importance of Kant's appeal to intuitive understanding in the third Critique, and in relating it to the Transcendental Ideal (the idea of an ens realissimum as a necessary idea of pure reason) in the first Critique, Hegel completes his appropriation of Kant's transcendental Logic by calling us to the ever-renewed task of assigning each and every one of the
